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Drawing the Line: Missouri Adopts the
Zone of Danger Rule for Bystander
Emotional Distress
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital'
Bass v. Nooney Co. 2 established negligent infliction of emotional distress
as an independent tort in Missouri.' The Missouri Supreme Court, however,
left open the question of if and when a bystander can recover under this cause
of action.4 The question remained unanswered for seven years until the
Asaro decision. This Note will first analyze that decision, then focus on the
traditional rules and restrictions on bystander recovery, and finally set forth
for consideration a proposed rule that is less restrictive than the one adopted
by the Missouri Supreme Court.
I. FACTS
On July 19, 1983, Mrs. Asaro's five-year-old son, Leonard, underwent
heart surgery to remove a subaortic fibrous ring.5 The surgery took place at
Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital with a staff physician performing the
operation.6 The entire fibrous ring was not removed by the surgery; however,
in his post-operative report, the operating physician incorrectly stated that the
entire ring was removed.7
Due to the presence of the remaining ring portion, Leonard suffered chest
pain and fainting spells, just as he had before the operation. The partial ring
was damaging his heart.9 Mrs. Asaro repeatedly informed the doctors of her
son's problems, which she realized were symptoms of the presence of the
1. 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
2. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
3. Id. at 772. See Note, Young v. Stensrude: Fishing Through Bass for the
Boundaries of Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 51 Mo. L. REv. 598 (1986).
4. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770 n.3.
5. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 597. Mrs. Asaro did not personally observe the surgery.
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., No. 56454 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1990)
(WESTLAW, MO-CS database).
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fibrous ring. ° Because of the incorrect post-operative report, however, her
efforts to obtain further medical attention for her son were ignored." To
compound the problem, on January 17, 1985, a different staff physician at
Cardinal Glennon performed another test on Leonard that indicated that the
entire fibrous ring had been removed. 2 The hospital staff relied upon the
new test, along with the inaccurate post-operative report, both of which
incorrectly indicated that the fibrous ring had been completely removed. As
a result, the staff saw no need to pursue further medical testing that would
have disclosed the presence of the remaining fibrous ring) 3 Ultimately, on
February 25, 1985, more than 19 months after the initial surgery, a surgeon
at a different hospital removed the remaining ring portion. 4
Mrs. Asaro filed suit against the hospital alleging that the doctors were
negligent by failing to provide her son with the requisite degree of health care
because they failed to remove the ring or to make an accurate report of the
operation.15 Due to this alleged negligence, "she underwent severe, medical-
ly diagnosable and significant emotional distress and depression." 16 Mrs.
Asaro sought damages from the doctors for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress upon her.'7
The trial court dismissed Mrs. Asaro's petition as failing to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.'8 The Eastern District Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded.' 9 The Missouri Supreme Court, after granting
transfer, held that "in Missouri, a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress resulting from observing physical injury to a third person
10. Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., No. 56454 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan.
16, 1990) (WESTLAW, MO-CS database).






17. Id. at 596. The original petition was filed by Mr. Asaro, Mrs. Asaro, and
Leonard, and contained three counts. Id Count I was Leonard's claim for medical
malpractice. Count II was Mr. and Mrs. Asaro's claim for medical expenses incurred
for the treatment of Leonard, as well as other special damages. Count III was Mrs.
Asaro's claim for emotional strain and depression caused by the doctors' negligence
in treating Leonard. Id. The petitioners voluntarily dismissed Counts I and II. Asaro
v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., No. 56454 (Mo Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1990)
(WESTLAW, MO-CS database).
18. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 596-97.
19. Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., No. 56454, (Mo Ct. App Jan. 16,
1990) (WEsTLAW, MO-CS database).
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only if the plaintiff is within the zone of danger, that is, he was placed in a
reasonable fear of physical injury to his own person. '
II. INSTANT DECISION
The court began its analysis by noting that this is a case of first
impression in Missouri,21 thus rejecting Mrs. Asaro's argument that she
stated a cause of action under Bass v. Nooney Co.22 The court noted that
Bass "expressly did not decide the question whether a cause of action exists
in Missouri when a plaintiff suffers mental or emotional distress upon
observing death or injury to a third person caused by a defendant's negli-
gence. 112
With its desire to abrogate the impact rule, the court saw itself faced with
a choice between two alternative rules of liability to "fill the vacuum:" 24 the
zone of danger standard and the reasonably foreseeable plaintiff standard.25
The court viewed the foreseeable plaintiff standard, which predicates
recovery upon whether emotional injury to the bystander was reasonably
foreseeable, as being murky and unworkable. 6 The court noted that "a duty
of care ... arises out of circumstances in which there is a foreseeable
likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or injury."'27 But,
as noted by Dean Prosser, foreseeability goes "forward to eternity, and back
to the beginning of the world."'2 For this reason, the court felt duty should
not be defined as being "coextensive with foreseeability," but instead should
be more narrowly defined.29
20. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 596, 599-600.
21. Id. at 598.
22. Id. at 597-98. Bass involved a plaintiff who allegedly suffered emotional
distress as a result of being trapped inside a stalled elevator due to the defendant's
negligence. The Missouri Supreme Court held that recovery was permitted if the
plaintiff could show that: (1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress
or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so
as to be medically significant. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765,772 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc).
23. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 597 (quoting Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770).
24. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 598.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 598-99.
27. Id. at 598 (quoting Lowrey v. Horvath, 689 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc)).
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The court believed the zone of danger rule was the preferable standard
because the rule "permits recovery according to the defendant's already
existing duty of care to the plaintiff," and does not "require the defendant to
bear a new duty to a potential foreseeable plaintiff," as would the foreseeable
plaintiff standard.30 In adopting the zone of danger test, the court recognized
that it was an arbitrary standard.31 The court pointed out, however, that it
was necessary, under the common law system, for courts to establish rules and
limitations of liability "to allow tort law to achieve its purpose of compensat-
ing persons injured by the negligence of others without fostering rules of
liability which unreasonably inhibit normal human activity."
32
The court concluded that in Missouri
a plaintiff states a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress upon injury to a third person only upon a showing: (1) that the
defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable
risk to the plaintiff, (2) that plaintiff was present at the scene of an injury
producing, sudden event, (3) and that plaintiff was in the zone of danger,
i.e., placed in a reasonable fear of physical injury to his or her own
person.3
Because Mrs. Asaro's petition contained no assertion that she was placed
in danger or faced personal peril by negligent acts of the defendants, the court
concluded that she did not fall within the zone of danger standard.3,4 Thus,
the trial court was correct in dismissing her petition for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.5
30. Id. at 599.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 599-600.
34. Id. at 600.
35. Id. The dissent (Judges Higgins, Rendlen and Billings) argued that this is not
a case of first impression in Missouri, but instead falls under the rule enunciated in
Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en bane). For a statement of the
rule of that case, see supra note 22. Mrs. Asaro alleged in her petition that she
underwent "severe emotional stress and depression, medically diagnosable and
significant," and that "[a]U defendants should have realized that their conduct ...
involve[d] an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or mental injury to
Plaintiff." Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 601. Thus, her petition would survive a motion to
dismiss under the requirements of Bass. Id. According to the dissent, the zone of
danger requirement is not set forth in Bass, and should not be adopted, as it is an
"arbitrary" and "hopelessly artificial" standard. Id. 4




Medical and psychological experts generally accept that when individuals
observe negligent acts resulting in physical injury to another, they will
normally suffer a "psychic trauma," that is, "an emotional shock which makes
a lasting impression on the mind."3 6 This emotional shock can, under certain
circumstances, have a serious and debilitating impact on an individual's
physical and psychological well-being. 7 Recently, courts have shown
increased willingness to allow compensation to bystanders who suffer this
emotional distress. Courts are faced with a problem, however. On the one
hand, they want victims to be compensated for any emotional distress
negligently caused by another. On the other hand, they want to avoid
fraudulent claims, unlimited liability, and increased litigation. 38 As a result,
courts are faced with the problem of what standards and limitations to apply.
Resolving this conflict is not an easy task, and courts have adopted a broad
range of rules and limitations. This section considers the rules and limitations
adopted by the various jurisdictions.
A. Theories of Recovery
1. The Physical Impact Rule
Under the physical impact rule, plaintiffs may recover only if there has
been a physical intrusion upon their body.39 Thus, an actual touching must
occur. As stated by one court, "the infliction of anguish by the negligent
injury of another, without physical trauma to the plaintiff would be irremedial.
36. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute
Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S. L. REv. 1, 22 (1976). See also
Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MARSH.
L. REv. 428, 430-37 (1957).
37. Every person who is subjected to an emotional shock will not necessarily
develop a psychological injury. Due to heredity and environment, individuals differ
in the degree of and their susceptibility to mental injury. In any event, common
emotional situations rarely cause emotional injury to a well adjusted person. Cantor,
supra note 36, at 432-33.
38. See Simons, supra note 36, at 12-15.
39. Missouri followed the impact rule for a time, though not by name. That rule
was first established in Missouri in the case of Crutcher v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.
R.R., 132 Mo. App. 311, 111 S.W. 891 (1908). For the origin of the impact rule, see
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). For a discussion of the history of
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But where the defendant's negligence occasions some personal physical injury
to the plaintiff, no matter how slight, the plaintiff may recover for frights,
shock, and mental anguish.""4  The nature of this rule makes bystander
recovery virtually non-existent, as the victim could bring an action under
traditional tort principles. Several policy reasons stand behind the adoption
of the physical impact requirement: 1) trivial claims should be eliminated; 2)
courts should not be flooded with litigation; 4 3) claims should not be
speculative;4 7 and 4) fraudulent claims should be reduced.43
Today, most jurisdictions have rejected the physical impact rule,44 and
for good reason. First, due to advances in medical and psychological
techniques, emotional injuries are more readily provable and thus emotional
distress can be competently established. 5 The court system is able to rely
upon this competent medical proof of emotional distress and the trier of fact's
ability to detect fraudulent claims.46 Second, "[w]hether the plaintiff has
suffered an impact bears little relationship to the harm-a near miss may be
as [emotionally damaging] as a direct hit."47 Finally, the rule is subject to
manipulation by courts.48 Several have allowed the slightest touch to qualify
40. Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 98, 143 A.2d 588, 597 (1958).
41. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Ward v. West Jersey &
Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
261 A.2d 84 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737
(1902); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Hickey v. Welch,
91 Mo. App. 4 (1901); Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A.
561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester, 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 567 (1898); Charlie Stuart
Oldsmobile v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315,357 N.E.2d 247 (1978); Morse v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335
(1899); Mitchell v. Rochester, 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
44. Simons, supra note 36, at 7-8; Comment, Dillon to Ochoa: The Elusive
Foreseeability of Emotional Distress, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 91, 94 (1987). See
generally C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 190-96 (2d ed. 1980); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 359-66 (5th ed. 1984).
45. Simons, supra note 36, at 8.
46. Id. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
47. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1982).
48. Recent Decisions, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 588, 590 (1990).
1188 [Vol. 56
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as physical contact, despite the fact that no physical injury occurred.49
Clearly the physical impact rule is unnecessary and too artificial for modern
usage.
2. The Zone of Danger Rule
The zone of danger rule was established in the famous case of Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co.,50 and allows bystander recovery for emotional
distress only upon a showing that the bystander was in the physical zone of
danger; that is, that the bystander was "placed in a reasonable fear of physical
injury to his or her own person."51 Thus, the bystander must have been
within a definable physical location when the injury producing event occurred
for recovery to ensue. No requirement exists that physical impact must occur.
Recovery is limited, however, to the emotional distress resulting from
reasonable fear of personal, physical injury, not fear for injury to another.52
A person located within the zone of danger can recover "because the
negligent defendant.., owed all foreseeable plaintiffs a duty of due care not
to endanger their physical well-being." 53 The zone of danger test is used to
determine "whether the plaintiff was sufficiently proximate to the defendant's
negligent conduct so that injury to the plaintiff could have been reasonably
foreseen by the defendant, thereby imposing upon the defendant a duty to act
carefully in regard to the class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged."54
One court summed up the rationale behind the zone of danger rule by saying,
the rule is "premised on the traditional negligence concept that by unreason-
ably endangering the plaintiff's physical safety the defendant has breached a
duty owed to him or her for which he or she should recover all damages
49. Id. (citing Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL L. REv. 847, 849 (1981));
Pearson, supra note 47, at 488. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga.
App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928); Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62
N.E. 737 (1902); Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906);
Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961); See W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, at 363 (5th ed. 1984).
50. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
51. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 600.
52. Id. at 599; See Pearson, supra note 47, at 485-90.
53. Note, Putting the Brakes on the Bandwagon: Nebraska Slows Runaway Tort
Liability in Bystander Claims of Emotional Distress-James v. Lieb, 20 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 741, 753-54 (1987).
54. Simons, supra note 36, at 9.
1991] 1189
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sustained."5 5 If the bystander is outside the zone of danger, then no duty is
owed by the negligent actor.
Courts are attracted to the zone of danger rule because of its predictabili-
ty and the rigid outer boundary of recovery it creates.56 Critics, however,
believe the rule does not further "the policy that negligent defendants should
be liable for all harm foreseeably caused by their negligence., 57  Many
situations are imaginable where an actor is extremely negligent, severe
emotional injury is foreseeable, and the resulting injury is great, but recovery
is denied based upon the bystander's location. As a result, the zone of danger
rule may be arbitrary and unnecessarily rigid.
3. The Foreseeable Plaintiff Standard
Dillon v. Legg 8 gave birth to the foreseeable plaintiff standard in
bystander recovery cases, holding that bystanders who witness accidents can
recover for emotional distress even though they did not fear for their own
safety.59 This holding expanded bystander recovery by recognizing the harm
caused by "fear for the safety of others as appropriate damages. ,
61
Under the foreseeability rule set forth in Dillon, courts must, on a case-
by-case basis, decide whether an ordinary person would have reasonably
foreseen the emotional injury to the bystander due to their negligent act.61
If no foreseeable injury is present, no duty of care is owed to the bystander. 2
The Dillon court set forth three factors courts should consider in determining
whether an emotional injury was foreseeable:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
55. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219,230, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d
357, 361 (1984).
56. Note, supra note 53, at 754. See also Pearson, supra note 47, at 490.
57. Pearson, supra note 47, at 485. See also Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759
(Ohio 1983).
58. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
59. Id. See also Comment, supra note 44, at 96-97.
60. Pearson, supra note 47, at 491.
61. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
62. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79; See VanDeWeghe, California
Continues to Struggle With Bystander Claims for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Thing V. La Chusa, 24 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 89, 93 (1990).
1190 [Vol. 56
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(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relation-
ship.6
3
The Dillon court did not intend these factors to be rigid requirements, but
rather loose guidelines to aid case-by-case determinations."
The foreseeable plaintiff standard is based upon general negligence
principles,6 and does not proceed from the same premise as the impact and
zone of danger rules.66 Courts recognize that, with this standard, the
bystander's emotional injury is caused by fear for the safety of another person,
and liability is not predicated on actual or anticipated physical intrusion upon
the bystander.67
The foreseeable plaintiff standard has been criticized as an expansion of
the rules of liability and damages.68 As stated by the Asaro court, the
"[z]one of danger [rule] permits recovery according to the defendant's already
existing duty of care to the plaintiff, [while the foreseeable plaintiff standard]
require[s] the defendant to bear a new duty to a potential foreseeable
plaintiff. "69 This "new duty" is seen by some courts as an invitation to both
unlimited liability and an avalanche of litigation inundating the court
system. 70 The foreseeable plaintiff standard has also been criticized as being
a "murky standard"7' because it has not been consistently applied. 72
63. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
64. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80; Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 581, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (1976).
65. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
66. Note, Bystander Recovery in Illinois for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 15 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 453, 464 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Pearson, supra note 47, at 491-501; Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116,259
A.2d 12 (1969).
69. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 599.
70. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1989).
71. Asaro, 799 S.W.2d at 598.
72. See Pearson, supra note 47, at 491-501; Asaro, 599 S.W.2d at 598-99.
1991) 1191
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B. Limitations on Recovery
1. Physical Manifestation
To ensure genuine claims, many courts require the plaintiff to show
physical manifestations directly caused by the emotional distress."3 Exam-
ples of physical manifestations considered by some jurisdictions include
weight loss, sleeplessness, intense nervousness, personality changes, nerve
tissue degeneration, miscarriage, nervous breakdown, or paralysis.74
Due to advances in the medical and psychological fields regarding
diagnosis and provability of emotional injury, a minority of courts have started
retreating from the physical manifestation requirement.75 These courts accept
that severe mental distress can occur without accompanying physical
symptoms, and that there are other ways to assure genuineness of the
emotional distress.76
2. Sudden Impact
Courts adopting even the most liberal theory of bystander recovery still
require the mental injury to stem from a traumatic shock, as opposed to
chronic stress.77 The cause of the emotional distress "must be a single,
sudden, or unexpected event; a shock to the bystander's mental and psycho-
logical equilibrium; or a trauma or 'blow' to his nervous system." 78 Medical
authority exists, however, that supports the proposition that chronic stress is
even more damaging to a bystander's emotional well-being than is traumatic
73. Simons, supra note 36, at 12; Comment, supra note 44, at 95-96; Note,
supra note 66, at 470. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313(1)(b),
436A comment b (1965).
74. Comment, supra note 44, at 96, 109 (citing Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210
A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4 (1956)).
75. Simons, supra note 36, at 12; Note, supra note 66, at 471.
76. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398,520 P.2d 758 (1974); Culbert
v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
404 A.2d 672 (1979); see Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress
Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 164 (1976); Comment,
Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for Bystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
931, 940 (1982).
77. Simons, supra note 36, at 16. See, e.g., Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp.,
480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973).
78. Owens, 480 F.2d at 465. (citing Seizer, Psychic Disabilities Following
Trauma, 1970 LEGAL MED. ANN. 389, 398-401).
1192 [Vol. 56
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shock.79  Despite this authority, the necessity of a traumatic shock is
ingrained in the law of torts and is likely to remain for some time."0
3. Contemporaneous Observation
Dillon, which established the foreseeable plaintiff standard, also set forth
guidelines for courts to use in case-by-case determinations of whether
bystander emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable. One factor is
"[w]hether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon [the]
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence."81
Recovery may not be allowed unless the plaintiff was near enough in time and
distance to observe the accident.82
The observation factor was not intended to be used as a strict test or rigid
requirement, but most courts have used it as such.8 3 Other courts view the
factor merely as a guideline, so the closer the plaintiff is to observing an
accident, the more likely his or her claim will be allowed.84 In addition,
"observation" has been interpreted by some courts to mean "perception."
Thus, the plaintiff need not actually witness the accident visually, but need
only perceive that the negligent actor is harming the victim, such as by
hearing the occurrence of the injury.85
79. Id. at 465 (citing Seizer, supra note 78, at 399). See also Seizer, Psychologi-
cal Stress andLegal Concepts ofDisease Causation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951, 952-54
(1971).
80. Simons, supra note 36, at 17.
81. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
80 (1968).
82. Note, supra note 66, at 467.
83. Comment, supra note 44, at 97-98. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980); Cortez v. Marcias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167
Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr.
495 (1978).
84. Comment, supra note 44, at 98. See, e.g., Austin v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979); Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80
Cal. App. 3d. 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978); Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1975); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell Sons, Inc., 381
Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Landreth v. Reed, 520 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
85. Comment, supra note 44, at 101. See, e.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
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Rationale for the observation rule is twofold. First, as stated by the
Dillon court, "the degree of foreseeability of the third person's injury is far
greater in the case of his contemporaneous observance of the accident than
that in which he subsequently learns of it."' Second, without this limitation
the negligent actor could be liable to a multitude of people who were not at
the scene of the accident, but suffered some sort of emotional distress upon
learning the news. The result would be unlimited liability! 7 Conversely,
courts that apply the location requirement loosely believe plaintiffs who arrive
on the accident scene shortly after its occurrence suffer emotional distress as
severe as bystanders who witness the incident, and should therefore also be
compensated."
4. Close Relationship
Under the guidelines set forth in Dillon, courts are to consider the
closeness of the relationship between the bystander and the victim in
determining the reasonable foreseeability of emotional distress.8 9 The more
attached the bystander is to the victim, the greater the chance of serious
emotional injuries." Therefore, the close relationship factor ensures that the
emotional distress claim is genuine, while at the same time places a limit on
liability.91 In addition, it is more foreseeable to the negligent actor that a
bystander will suffer emotional distress when observing injury to a close




A better rule is to adopt a zone of emotional danger standard, which is
a modification of the reasonably foreseeable plaintiff standard found in Dillon.
To curtail unlimited liability and reduce the number of potential claims, a few
86. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
87. Comment, supra note 44, at 95. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,249
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
88. Note, supra note 66, at 469. See, e.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969).
89. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
90. Note, supra note 66, at 466 (citing Comment, supra note 76, at 942).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Pearson, supra note 47, at 497.
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limitations should apply: (1) the presence of the bystander must be reasonably
foreseeable to the tortfeasor; (2) the likelihood of emotional injury must be
reasonably foreseeable to the tortfeasor; (3) a reasonable bystander must be
likely to suffer the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be
serious. This proposed rule allows bystander recovery while avoiding unduly
burdensome liability. Both policy considerations as well as the bystander's
interest in emotional well-being are recognized.
B. The Standard
Under the zone of physical danger rule, a person who suffers extreme
emotional distress upon observing the negligent infliction of injury to a loved
one may recover, while a second party suffering identical injuries may not,
simply because the second party was a few feet further from the incident. 94
This result is too arbitrary and cannot be tolerated. If the negligent actor can
reasonably foresee that the bystander's observation of serious injury to another
may cause severe emotional injury, then recovery should be allowed. Legal
scholars generally accept that emotional injury to bystanders is indeed a
foreseeable result of negligent conduct.'
The reasonably foreseeable plaintiff standard is the only rule of bystander
recovery that allows compensation for emotional distress suffered solely for
being placed in fear for the safety of another. 6 The impact and zone of
danger rules do not allow such recovery. Foreseeability is a more realistic
approach, because it recognizes that the real reason bystanders suffer
emotional distress is because they are perceiving the tortious injury of another,
not because of fear for personal safety.98 This emotional injury does not
depend upon whether bystanders were placed in danger of physical injury.9
Whether the plaintiff was located within the physical zone of danger is not
relevant to the amount of emotional injury suffered."°
If emotional distress is a foreseeable consequence of a particular
negligent act and emotional injury results, the applicable zone of danger
should be one of emotional distress, rather than physical injury." A zone
94. Simons, supra note 36, at 10.
95. Note, supra note 66, at 481. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613,
249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559 (1969).
96. See Leibson, supra note 76, at 196; Simons, supra note 36, at 11; Note, supra
note 66, at 455.
97. See Note, supra note 66, at 461.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Simons, supra note 36, at 10.
101. Id. at 10-11.
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of physical danger is relevant to define a duty for physical harm.0 2
Likewise, a zone of emotional danger should be relevant in defining a duty for
emotional harm. 0 3 To use a zone of physical danger to limit a negligent
actor's liability for emotional injuries is not practical.' °
The proposed standard restricts the duty of care owed by a negligent
actor to a reasonably foreseeable emotional zone of danger.105 To recover,
the plaintiff must be located in this zone. The foreseeable zone of emotional
distress is defined as the area in which emotional distress may be reasonably
anticipated.' °6 This zone is not limited to a defined physical area around the
victim because trauma does not depend on proximity to the negligent act.
10 7
Thus, the foreseeable zone of emotional danger is different, and in most cases
larger, than the foreseeable zone of physical danger.'08
C. Policy Considerations
One fear of the foreseeability standard often cited by courts and
commentators is that if this liberal rule of bystander recovery is adopted, the
number of fraudulent claims will increase. This fear of fraudulent claims is
not valid, as legal scholars generally agree that courts would not be subjected
to a flood of false claims if the foreseeability standard were adopted.) 9
Since the first implementations of the zone of danger rule, tremendous
advances in the medical field regarding the diagnosis and understanding of
emotional trauma have taken place."0 These advances greatly reduce the
chances that trivial or fraudulent claims will succeed."' Courts can rely on
the medical profession's expertise and the judicial system's ability to weed out
false claims, rather than the overly restrictive zone of danger rule."2 To
deny recovery based on fear of fraudulent claims penalizes honest persons and
shows a lack of faith in the judicial system."
Another policy consideration mitigating against bystander recovery is the
fear of a proliferation of claims. The adoption of the foreseeable zone of
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 9. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
109. See Note, supra note 66, at 480.
110. See id. at 464.
111. Id. at 480.
112. Id.; Comment, supra note 44, at 110-11.
113. Simons, supra note 36, at 13.
1196 [Vol. 56
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/10
BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
emotional danger rule does not guarantee that courts will be flooded with
litigation. Even if the court system's caseload would increase, an individual
who is injured by a negligent actor is entitled to a remedy. 4 As stated by
Dean Prosser,
[i]t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a flood of litigation; and it is a pitiful confession of incompe-
tence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the grounds that
it will give the court too much work to do. 15
D. Limitations
One limitation not necessary for the foreseeable zone of emotional danger
standard is the requirement that there exist physical manifestations of
emotional injury. Advances in the medical profession regarding diagnosis and
provability of emotional injury make the requirement of a physical manifesta-
tion accompanying emotional injury unnecessary.'1 6 Better ways prevail to
ensure genuine claims. Another limitation not necessary for the foreseeable
zone of emotional danger standard is the requirement that the bystander
witness the event as it unfolds. The emotional trauma of seeing a loved one
shortly after an accident can be just as severe as if the bystander witnessed the
injury as it occurred."' What amount of time must pass before a person
arriving on the scene will be denied recovery depends on the circumstances
and should be decided on a case-by-case basis."'
Compensation should not be allowed for every emotional harm that
occurs in daily living, but there should be some point at which individuals will
be allowed a remedy for the denial of their right to emotional tranquility.1
9
In bystander cases, the line needs to be drawn at serious emotional dis-
tress.120 Otherwise, a tortfeasor would be faced with unlimited liability.
Some mental distress is an inescapable part of life and should not be
compensated. But when a negligent actor causes unusual or severe mental
harm, liability should ensue.12' The proposed cutoff is a simple one: A
114. See Note, supra note 66, at 462 (citing Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,
615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969)).
115. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH L.
REV. 874, 877 (1939).
116. Simons, supra note 36, at 12. See Note, supra note 66, at 478-79.
117. See Note, supra note 66, at 469.
118. See Comment, supra note 44, at 111-12.
119. Note, supra note 66, at 481.
120. Comment, supra note 44, at 107.
121. Id. at 108.
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bystander suffering from serious emotional distress will be compensated, a
bystander not suffering from serious emotional distress will not." Defining
serious emotional distress will be the difficult task." Some courts have
tried to provide workable definitions of serious distress. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief,
rage and humiliation are not considered serious.2 4 Ultimately, the court
system must rely on the medical profession's judgment and the trier of fact's
ability to recognize what constitutes serious emotional distress.
The reasonably foreseeable plaintiff standard recognizes that courts
should not allow compensation to every bystander who suffers emotional
injury due to injury or death of a loved one by a negligent actor.1"5
Recovery is limited to close family members because it is foreseeable that
they may suffer serious emotional distress.126 Those who are not related to
the victim are not likely to suffer serious emotional distress, but only sorrow
for a brief amount of time.' 27 Close family members have a much greater
chance of suffering severe harm, and thus are more deserving of recovery. 128
The requirement that the bystander be a close family member, however,
should only be loosely adopted. There are many instances where a bystander
can have a strong emotional attachment, yet not be a close relative or family
member. Fiances and cohabitants are two examples of persons who may have
strong enough emotional ties to be deserving of recovery. Courts must
examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether the relationship
between bystander and victim can be characterized as a strong emotional
attachment.
Another issue that requires consideration is the bystander's preexisting
mental condition. Some individuals have conditions that make them more
susceptible to emotional trauma than the average individual. 29 Should a
negligent actor be held liable for a bystander's severe emotional injuries if,
under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have suffered serious
emotional distress? In a traditional tort case, the negligent actor must take the
victim as he finds him. 30  Any lack of mental stability is irrelevant.
122. Id. at 107.
123. Id. at 108-10.
124. Id. at 109 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c
(1966)).
125. Note, supra note 66, at 482-83.
126. Id. at 482.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Simons, supra note 36, at 26-27.
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Bystander cases, however, should be viewed in terms of the foreseeability of
the type and extent of damages.32 Thus, recovery will only ensue if a
reasonable person would suffer serious emotional distress under the circum-
stances. 33 In addition, foreseeability requires that the type and extent of
emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable by the negligent actor for the
actor to be held liable."3
Finally, to curtail unlimited liability and to satisfy the theory of
foreseeability, the requirement that the bystander's presence be reasonably
foreseen by the negligent actor should be imposed.135 This requirement was
adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court, which listed factors to consider in
determining whether a parent's presence at the scene of an accident was
foreseeable: "(1) the child's age; (2) the type of neighborhood in which the
accident occurred; (3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood;
(4) the time of day; and (5) any other factors which would put the tortfeasor
on notice of the witness' presence.""
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for courts to recognize bystander emotional distress
for what it truly is: fear for the safety of another, rather than fear for one's
own safety. The zone of emotional danger was formulated with this view in
mind, and is a more realistic standard than is the zone of physical danger.
In recognition of important policy considerations, courts adopting a
standard must draw a line where bystanders will be allowed a cause of action,
and where they will not. Under the zone of emotional danger standard, if
emotional distress is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a particular
negligent act, then liability will ensue. The only limitations necessary are:
(1) the presence of the bystander must be reasonably foreseeable to the
tortfeasor; (2) the likelihood of emotional injury must be reasonably
foreseeable to the tortfeasor; (3) a reasonable bystander must be likely to
suffer the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be serious.
The zone of emotional danger, with the suggested limitations, is a workable
rule and is the only rule consistent with policy considerations while recogniz-
ing and protecting a bystander's interest in emotional well-being.
MICHAEL PHILLIPS
132. Id. at 26-27.
133. Id. at 28.
134. Id. at 26-27.
135. See id. at 30-31.
136. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 409, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (1974).
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